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Over the years, modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have become widely computerised and connected
via the Internet and are, therefore, potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks. Currently there is a lack of
vulnerability scanners specialised to ICS settings. Systems such as PLCScan and ModScan output pertinent
information from a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). However, they do not offer any information
as to how vulnerable a PLC is to an attack. In this paper, we address these limitations and propose
SimaticScan, a vulnerability scanner specialised to Siemens SIMATIC PLCs. Through experimentation in
a comprehensive water treatment testbed, we demonstrate SimaticScan’s effectiveness in determining a
range of vulnerabilities across three distinct PLCs, including a previously unknown vulnerability in one of
the PLCs. Our experiments also show that SimaticScan outperforms the widely used Nessus vulnerability
scanner (with relevant ICS-specific plugins deployed).
industrial control systems, vulnerability scanner, programmable logic controllers
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) were once logically
and physical isolated from other business functions.
Greater levels of interconnectivity have been
achieved via the relatively recent adoption of
Information Technology (IT) within what are often
referred to as Operational Technology (OT) devices
(devices specifically designed to provide monitoring,
control, or automation functionalities within a
physical process). Hybrid IT/OT interconnectivity
provides numerous benefits related to safety,
performance, regulatory compliance, cost saving,
etc. While such benefits contribute to organisational
objectives, additional risks are also introduced; risks
not considered in earlier deployments of ICS due to
their isolated, closed network design.
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and other
connected devices within ICSs are integral to the
core design and functionality of many industrial
processes. However, the deployment of such devices
does not often take into account the means
for correct implementation of cybersecurity, as
historically ICSs were not designed with security
as a core consideration. With cyber attacks on the
rise against these systems – the most recent being
the targeted power blackout in Ukraine (TrendMicro
2016) – there is an urgent need for tools to establish
a better understanding of the vulnerabilities in these
systems, across both IT and OT domains.
Existing work, e.g., Project SHINE (Infracritical
2014), has demonstrated that pertinent information
can be harvested from many PLCs – in SHINE’s
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case, by using the SHODAN (Shodan 2016) search
engine. While such analysis demonstrates that many
of these devices are publicly searchable, it does
not offer practical insights into how vulnerable the
specific devices may be to a cyber attack.
In this paper, we present a specialised vulnerability
scanner, SimaticScan, specific to Siemens SIMATIC
PLCs. SimaticScan can be used to determine if any
PLCs found using the SHODAN search engine are
vulnerable to specific attacks by utilising the informa-
tion retrieved from relevant vulnerability databases.
SimaticScan thus addresses the limitations of exist-
ing scanners by retrieving fingerprint information of
a PLC and comparing it to a database of PLCs that
are already known to be vulnerable.
Furthermore, SimaticScan goes beyond simply
identifying “potential” vulnerabilities to verifying
the existence of these vulnerabilities in the PLC
under consideration. Through experimentation in a
comprehensive water treatment testbed (Green et al.
2016), we demonstrate SimaticScan’s effectiveness
in determining a range of vulnerabilities across
three distinct PLCs, including a previously unknown
vulnerability in one of the PLCs1. Our experiments
also show that SimaticScan outperforms the widely
used Nessus vulnerability scanner (with relevant
ICS-specific plugins deployed).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 discusses existing relevant work in this
area. Section 3 presents an overview of SimaticScan
and its various stages. Section 4 provides a brief
overview of the testbed used for experimentation.
Section 5 presents results of the experimentation
while Section 6 concludes the paper and identifies
directions for future work.
2. RELATED WORK
This section explores existing works which have
either sought to extract critical information from
PLCs, or have been designed to identify security
vulnerabilities in OT devices specifically.
Two lightweight port scanners, PLCScan (Digital
Bond 2016) and ModScan (Bristow 2008), attempt
to enumerate devices across the MODBUS and S7
protocols. The information retrieved from these tools
includes slave ID, device name, firmware version,
and CPU number. While the firmware version, for
example, can be applied to a custom search of a
vulnerability database (Toolswatch 2016) in order to
identify known associated vulnerabilities, neither tool
provides this level of functionality, requiring manual
1We note that this vulnerability has been disclosed to Siemens in
line with responsible disclosure practices.
user input, and knowledge of existing databases and
their use.
In the IT domain, a number of vulnerability scanning
tools are available. Tools such as Nessus, OpenVAS,
and Nexpose are all capable of performing vulner-
ability assessments, and generating comprehensive
reports. However, at the time of writing, only Nessus
has a function specifically designed for the assess-
ment of OT systems (described as a Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition SCADA plug-in). Sec-
tion 5 presents a comparison of SimaticScan against
this plugin.
As our tool is designed with Siemens Simatic PLCs
as a core focus, the work of Beresford (2011)
– discussing exploitation of Siemens SIMATIC S7
PLCs – is of particular note. In particular, three
attacks are discussed:
• Replay Attack allows an attacker to record
the incoming and outgoing traffic of a PLC,
and use this as a form of authentication
by replaying back a payload of packets with
the correct previously recorded authentication
packet. This vulnerability is achieved due to the
plain-text transmission of data within the S7
protocol.
• Reversing Memory Protections which could
result in an engineer or operator to be locked
out of the PLC.
• Creation of Crafted Packets that can read and
write data to the PLC, even dump the memory
residing in a PLC.
The work of Beresford (2011) offers practical insight
into Siemens PLC vulnerabilities. However, in order
to assess against these vulnerabilities, an assessor
requires the skills to craft their own packets,
alongside knowledge of the Metasploit framework.
Within SimaticScan, we build on the exploits
described here, but raise the levels of abstraction,
allowing an assessor to identify such vulnerabilities
without the described skills/knowledge.
3. SIMATICSCAN
Figure 1 depicts the logical flow of SimaticScan’s
operation. The workflow is linear, with calls to third
party libraries, including verification of user input
when the scanner requires it. Similar to traditional
vulnerability scanners, user input is kept to a
minimum, ensuring maximum automated operation.
The scanner proceeds through the consecutive
stages of the program and outputs information based
on a target’s susceptibility to specific vulnerabilities.
Some stages can potentially disrupt the target:
2
SimaticScan: A Specialised Vulnerability Scanner for Industrial Control Systems
Antrobus • Frey • Green • Rashid
the SNMP scan, DoS and fuzzing stages are
therefore made optional and should be enabled
only in controlled test environments where failure is
acceptable. The following subsections provide high-
level descriptions of each of the three phases in
Figure 1 and the stages within each phase.
Figure 1: Overview of SimaticScan
Phase I: Reconnaissance Scans
CPE/CVE Search. SimaticScan begins by finger-
printing the PLC and receiving information about
the PLC’s internals, such as the module name and
type, serial number, and basic hardware/firmware
versions. This stage of the scanner relies on a mod-
ified version of the aforementioned PLCScan tool.
Once retrieved, the firmware version is compared to
entries from a list of Common Platform Enumeration
(CPE) terms, specified by the vendor, in this case
Siemens. If the PLC firmware is less than, or equal
to, any of the current CPE terms, it is likely that a
vulnerability exists, as Siemens list their CPE entries
alongside a CVE entry. vFeed (Toolswatch 2016)
– a third-party centralised database of vulnerability
and mitigation data – is used to search for the CPE
and CVE entries associated with a particular PLC’s
firmware version. Using vFeed’s in-built API calls,
SimaticScan outputs any CVEs associated with the
PLC’s CPE entry, allowing the user to obtain more
information about a vulnerability, such as severity
and risk scores.
SNMP Scan. SimaticScan allows the user to
perform a Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) scan over a range of IP addresses. The
SNMP protocol is used to exchange information
between devices in a network, known as agents.
An SNMP manager – Scapy (secdev.org 2016) –
is used to communicate with all agents on the
network, and SimaticScan receives any response
from SNMP enabled devices. This information
highlights potential pivot points around the network.
For example, a scan might receive a response from
an engineering workstation, which could present
additional attack vectors a threat agent could exploit.
Phase II: Vulnerability Assessment
Verify Session IDs. This stage of SimaticScan is
inspired by the work of Beresford (2011), and
parses a Wireshark capture for session IDs that
may be transmitted in plaintext. Note that a session
ID acts as an authentication mechanism between
the operational workstation and PLC. Furthermore,
it is one that never expires. SimaticScan detects
if the session ID is in plaintext, and outputs the
vulnerability associated with it, i.e., an attacker could
conduct a replay attack against the PLC.
Verify Plaintext Vulnerabilities. After searching
for session IDs that may be transmitted in
plaintext, SimaticScan looks for additional plaintext
vulnerabilities, focusing on the identification of
commands sent from a workstation to a PLC. A
Wireshark capture is parsed to identify particular
commands sent to the PLC in plaintext. If plaintext
is found, Simaticscan informs the user and outputs
the associated vulnerability.
Verify Web Interface Vulnerabilities. Several PLCs
have a built in web interface, allowing for remote
monitoring and control. An attacker could seek to
exploit this, to gain information about the PLC and its
internals, such as time-stamping of commands and
operations, and CPU start/stop control functionality.
SimaticScan checks if port 80 is open, providing
access to a Siemens S7 web interface. As most
web interfaces require admin-level privileges to login,
SimaticScan searches whether the ones it finds
feature hard-coded default credentials – using public
records such as StrangeLove (2016) – and warns the
user accordingly.
Verify Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerabilities.
DoS is a process whereby an attacker sends a large
number of data packets to a target, thus flooding
it with too much data, leading to a system crash.
SimaticScan can perform this attack by sending
a large number of packets to the PLC over the
Siemens ISO-TSAP protocol.
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Verify TCP Hijack vulnerability. A TCP hijacking
attack is used to intercept the communications
between two networked hosts. During this particular
stage, SimaticScan aims to perform a TCP hijack
of a PLC, verifying if a spoof IP address can be
introduced. A spoofed IP address can be used
by an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle
attack, and also as a basis for redirecting TCP
traffic to and from the PLC. Identification of this
vulnerability shows that sequence numbers used
for authenticating TCP sessions between hosts are
not robust enough (not random enough). To this
end, SimaticScan attempts to guess the sequence
number (via successive increments, while monitoring
its own local sequence number) and establish
an authenticated TCP session with a spoofed IP
address.
Verify unauthorised read/write access. This stage
of the scan utilises a third-party Python library –
Snap7 (2016) – to determine if values stored in
a PLC’s memory can be read from, or written to.
The focus of this stage is to test if an attacker
can read/write values to/from the PLC’s datablocks
without any authentication, thus affecting a PLC’s
execution of logic.
Phase III: Fuzzing
Protocol fuzzing is the process of sending random, or
semi-random data to a process (Wang et al. (2013),
Kitagawa et al. (2010)). In the final stage of the scan,
SimaticScan determines if a PLC can be fuzzed, a
useful function for determining other vulnerabilities.
Fuzzing acts as a vulnerability research tool where
the data sent can identify additional vulnerabilities
that were not previously discovered. SimaticScan
sends random data to the PLC and provides the
outputs. Examples of random payloads include:
1. Random strings of ASCII characters.
2. Single-character strings.
3. Blocks of ASCII punctuation characters.
4. HTML-encoded strings.
SimaticScan does not provide feedback regarding
the result of the fuzzing phase: for instance, the
operator must check whether the target has crashed
and possibly restart it manually. This limitation
(also affecting the potentially disruptive SNMP scan
and DoS phases) is a an opportunity for future
improvements of SimaticScan.
4. OVERVIEW OF THE TESTBED
Our ICS testbed (Green et al. 2014, 2016) provides
a broad range of ICS devices, physically applied,
with no simulation. Virtualisation is used in order to
allow for greater flexibility and scaling of workstation
and server implementation across the system.
Nevertheless, the routing of these systems remains
under physical network device responsibility.
This use of physical devices – PLCs in particular
– and physical network routing provides a high
level of credibility to the experiments conducted
and discussed throughout section 5. We note that
the network architecture of the testbed has been
reviewed by industry experts and deemed valid and
representative of real-world large scale distributed
systems. It should also be noted that, although it
is not the focus of the experiments in this particular
paper, the testbed also covers the intersection of IT
and OT environments.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Three Siemens PLCs in the above testbed were
used for evaluation: the S7-1200 (Siemens 2016b),
S7-300 (Siemens 2016c), and ET200S (Siemens
2016a). The following subsections discuss the vul-
nerabilities discovered through the use of Simatic-
Scan. In addition to SimaticScan, Nessus and its
associated SCADA plug-in were also deployed –
cf. Security (2015). This allowed for a comparison
of SimaticScan’s effectiveness with an existing com-
mercial vulnerability scanner. Finally, SimaticScan
was also run against a SCADA honeypot: Conpot
(2016).
5.1. SimaticScan deployment over the testbed
The results of scanning the three PLCs, i.e., the S7-
1200, the S7-300 and the ET 200SP, with Simatic-
Scan are shown in Figure 2. The comments in the
figure summarise any discovered vulnerabilities, or
suggestions as to why a vulnerability was not found,
e.g., a known patch had been applied.
It can be seen that the S7-1200 was vulnerable
to 8 categories of vulnerabilities. A high number of
CVEs were returned, alongside the web interface
vulnerability. Protocol fuzzing yielded no additional
vulnerabilities. When performing an SNMP scan, the
SNMP network was not enabled for the S7-1200.
Therefore, any potential pivot points in the network
were not returned. The session ID vulnerability has
been patched by Siemens in firmware 2.0. As the
firmware of this PLC was 3.0.2, no plaintext session
IDs could be found.
The S7-300 was vulnerable to only one CVE.
This vulnerability (CVE-2015-2177) is a denial of
service vulnerability, and differs from the S7-1200
CVEs, as it affects the entire range of S7-300
PLCs, regardless of the firmware version. Again,
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Figure 2: Results of scanning the three PLCs with SimaticScan
the session ID vulnerability was patched, and the
web interface was not configured, therefore no web
server vulnerabilities were identified. The SNMP
scan found potential pivot points including the
engineering workstation, and another PLC located
on the same subnet. Protocol fuzzing yielded no
additional vulnerabilities.
The ET 200SP forms part of Siemens’ more
recent/modern range of PLCs. Because of this, no
CPE or CVE information could be found in the vFeed
database. Research from other resources, such as
Siemens Product Advisory, also found no publicly
known vulnerabilities. The SNMP scan returned
potential pivot points of the engineering workstation,
another PLC, and a CCTV camera, all operating on
the subnet. The session ID was not found, and the
web interface was not configured, therefore no web
server vulnerabilities were identified
Previously unknown vulnerability of ET 200SP.
Phase III of SimaticScan – protocol fuzzing – caused
a denial of service on the ET200S, with only a
small quantity of packets sent. This DoS vulnerability
was not witnessed across the older S7-1200 and
S7-300 PLCs. In accordance with the principles of
responsible disclosure, we do not provide additional
details regarding the exact vulnerability. Contact
has been established with Siemens to study the
vulnerability in more detail.
5.2. Comparing SimaticScan and Nessus
As discussed earlier, vulnerability scanners such
as Nexpose and OpenVAS contain no plugins or
procedures for checking the vulnerabilities of a
PLC. Of the mainstream vulnerability scanners, only
Nessus offers such functionality (Security (2015)).
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Figure 3: Results of Nessus scan of S7-1200
Figure 4: Results of a general Nessus scan
Therefore, we contrast the output of SimaticScan
and Nessus.
There exist a total of 61 SCADA plugins that Nessus
uses when scanning for vulnerabilities in an ICS. As
SimaticScan is concerned with the Siemens range
of PLCs, other SCADA plugins for vendors, such as
those from Schneider and Rockwell are disregarded.
Nessus uses the following plugins when performing
a vulnerability scan of Siemens PLC devices:
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC Web Server
Detection
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC < 4.1 Open
Redirection
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC Firmware
Detection
• Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC< 4.1.3 XSRF
These plugins are only associated with the Siemens
S7-1200 PLC, hence we had no expectation to find
vulnerabilities associated with the S7-300 and the ET
200SP.
Figure 3 shows the vulnerabilities reported by
Nessus for the S7-1200. It can be seen that the only
information that Nessus was able to retrieve was the
PLC Firmware Detection. This plugin of Nessus did
not actually return the firmware version number used
to check if it is vulnerable according to any CVEs
like SimaticScan does. Nor did it return the other
vulnerabilities that SimaticScan detected.
Nessus was also unable to detect the web server
residing on the S7-1200 PLC. However, when we
conducted a Nessus “general” scan, it returned
vulnerabilities associated with SSL certificates
relating to the web server (cf. Figure 4). So while
Nessus does not detect the web server for the
PLC through its SCADA plugin, the general scan
detects the PLC as a web server and the weak
SSL certificates. In contrast, while SimaticScan
detects the web server, it does not detect the SSL
vulnerabilities.
5.3. SimaticScan vs. SCADA honeypot
Conpot is a configurable ICS/SCADA software
honeypot that allows cybersecurity professionals
and ICS owners to assess how potential threats
would attack a real-world SCADA system (Conpot
(2016)). A honeypot is a system that is intentionally
misconfigured to be vulnerable. This has the effect in
that any potential attackers are more likely to attack
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this more vulnerable system. We use the honeypot
here as a benchmark measuring how SimaticScan
performed against a known vulnerable target.
Conpot allows real hardware, such as PLCs to be
simulated by creating protocol stacks and templates
in software. Using its default template, it simulates a
Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 PLC, as well as MODBUS
TCP and other protocols, such as, SNMP and HTTP.
We ran SimaticScan against Conpot’s default
profile for a S7-200 PLC and made the following
observations:
• SimaticScan identified two vulnerabilities: DoS
attacks and default credentials in web inter-
face.
• The software used to directly communicate
with the (simulated) PLC was unavailable on
the machine running SimaticScan. Therefore,
session ID and plaintext vulnerabilities could
not be found as traffic data between an
engineering workstation and the PLC could not
be established.
• TCP-hijack vulnerabilities could not be verified
as the Conpot implementation is a virtual
system that binds itself to the loopback (home)
interface of the machine running SimaticScan.
Therefore, an attempt to TCP-hijack the PLC
cannot be made, as SimaticScan tries to hijack
the connection originating from the Conpot
servers, not the connection to the PLC.
• Read/write vulnerabilities could not be estab-
lished, as the data blocks on the Conpot PLC
had different values and could not be inferred
due to time constraints.
The web interface vulnerability does not come as
a surprise: it is a design decision to leave default
credentials in Conpot’s web server to entice attacks.
On the other hand, the denial of service vulnerability
could threaten the availability of the honeypot.
This experiment can be considered from two
complementary angles:
• Evaluating how exhaustive a vulnerability scan-
ner is with respect to established vulnerabili-
ties, as implemented in honeypots.
• Evaluating how exhaustive and realistic a
honeypot is when scanned and compared to
the actual system it emulates.
As noted in the remarks above, some potential
vulnerabilities could not be identified due to
limitations on both sides: default configuration and
lack of compatible software in Conpot, ability to
capture loopback traffic or detect data blocks
in SimaticScan. Such an experiment encourages
a virtuous cycle, where scanner and honeypot
discover each other’s limitations and improve based
on their mutual evaluations.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As the level of connectivity in ICS grows, it
is increasingly important to develop defensive
solutions that are specialised to such settings.
Our comparison of SimaticScan and Nessus
demonstrates the value that can be derived from
hybrid IT/OT approaches, particularly when utilised
with existing general purpose systems such as
Nessus.
In order to further establish the importance of
such specialised systems, we undertook a SHODAN
search of the three PLCs we utilised in our
evaluation. We discovered 141 S7-1200, 40 S7-
300 and 14 ET 200SP PLCs connected to
the global internet. Any unpatched vulnerabilities
and/or previously unknown vulnerabilities in these
PLCs pose a significant risk. Such risks can be
mitigated through identification of vulnerabilities
using specialised tools such as SimaticScan.
In future work, the code of SimaticScan will
be consolidated and its functionality extended.
The variety of equipment available in Lancaster
University’s tesbed allows the study of equipment
from various providers, including, for instance,
Siemens, Allen Bradley, and Schneider, for which
we plan to build further specialised vulnerability
scanners.
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